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Taming the Hydra: Funding the 
Lithium Ion Supply Chain in an 
Era of Unprecedented Volatility
Chris Berry
Abstract
The lithium ion supply chain is set to grow in both size and importance over 
the coming decade due to government-led efforts to decarbonize economies and 
declining costs of lithium ion batteries used in electronics and transportation. With 
forecasts of demand for lithium chemicals alone forecast to grow by three times later 
this decade, at least $10B USD is needed to flow into the upstream supply chain to 
ensure an efficient and timely build-out. Significant additional capital is needed for 
other portions of the supply chain such as other raw materials, cathode or anode 
production, and battery cell manufacturing. Recent exogenous shocks such as the 
US-China trade war and coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic have made 
securing adequate capital for the supply chain a difficult challenge. Without the 
steady stream of funding for new mine and chemical conversion capacity, wide-
spread adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) could be put at risk. This paper discusses 
the current structure of the lithium ion supply chain with a focus on raw material 
production and the need for and challenges associated with securing adequate 
capital in an industry that has, to date, not experienced such a robust growth profile.
Keywords: lithium, capital, capital allocation, investment, lithium ion, supply chain
1. Introduction
In Greek mythology, the hydra was a nine-headed monster that terrorized the 
local populace. When one of the hydra’s heads was cut off, two grew back in its 
place. This evolving menace was ultimately killed by Heracles and his nephew Iolaus 
with Heracles severing each head and Iolaus cauterizing the wound, preventing the 
regrowth of additional heads.
In modern times, a problem described as a hydra is one which is multifaceted or 
continually evolving. The lithium ion supply chain has some similarities with the 
hydra in that there are multiple businesses (mining, refining, cathode and anode 
production, battery cell and pack production) which are all different in terms of 
operational complexity and funding needs. Figure 1 demonstrates a high-level 
overview of the lithium supply chain.
Despite the complexity, the lithium ion supply chain is positioned for a strong 
growth based on the twin tailwinds of government requirements for decarbon-
ization and falling lithium ion battery costs in the next decade. By the author’s 
estimates, should electric vehicles (EVs) become 10% of global autosales later this 
decade, this would require three times more lithium than is currently produced 
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globally today, given certain assumptions on battery size in kilowatt-hours (kWh) 
and battery chemistry. This tripling of demand ignores the growth in other sectors 
that use lithium such as pharmaceuticals or glass and ceramics.
However, the trajectory of this rather sunny scenario has recently been called 
into question. The US-China trade war and simultaneous supply and demand shock 
of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) are forcing investors and companies—
traditional sources of capital to feed the growth of the supply chain—to pause 
and scrutinize capital allocation decisions. The entire industry is just beginning to 
understand the implications of these shocks, and this evolution can cause capital 
commitments to freeze or vanish altogether. In the past year alone, major lithium 
producers Albemarle, Sociedad Química y Minera de Chile (SQM), Livent, Ganfeng 
Lithium, and Tianqi Lithium (known collectively as “the Big Five” as they produce 
the majority of global lithium supply) have halted or slowed production expansion 
plans due to low lithium prices and softer than expected demand. The macroshocks 
referred to above have also hurt the development-stage mining companies with 
high-profile failures becoming more frequent.
With its multiple subsectors (mining, refining, cathode and anode production, 
and separator production, battery production, automotive), the comparison of the 
lithium ion supply chain to the hydra is apt.
The winds of change have dawned on one head of the hydra—the global auto-
motive business. Mary Barra, chief executive officer (CEO) of General Motors (GM) 
referred to this volatility, stating in 2017:
I have no doubt that the automotive industry will change more in the next five to 
10 years than it has in the last 50. The convergence of connectivity, vehicle electrifi-
cation, and evolving customer needs demand new solutions [1].
In an environment where equity investors view results on a quarterly basis, 
lithium company CEOs and chief financial officers (CFOs) are under immense 
pressure to deliver immediate returns to shareholders while at the same time 
ensuring that they maintain or increase market share by investing in the future and 
managing a lag in recouping those costs in the future.
This paper discusses the upstream lithium ion supply chain through the lens of 
capital allocation. The various subsectors of the business can be thought of as various 
heads of the ancient hydra—unwieldy, growing, and hungry (in this case for finan-
cial capital). I will discuss why governments around the world are intent on decar-
bonizing the transport sector, the importance of investment during different phases 
of the capital cycle, and the traditional challenges associated with capital allocation.
Figure 1. 
A high level view of the lithium supply chain today. Source: House Mountain Partners, LLC.
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Trade war dynamics and COVID-19 have shocked the global economy and given 
investors pause in terms of how, when, and where to invest. The lithium ion supply 
chain is not immune here, but nobody disputes that in 10 years’ time, this supply 
chain will be larger and more critical to the global economy than it is today. What 
is debatable is what the supply chain will look like and how to structure and deploy 
the enormous sums necessary for growth.
2. Why electrify?
The push for the electrification of transport via increased EV penetration centers 
on government goals to decarbonize the sector and mitigate the effects of climate 
change. At least 14 countries have announced their intention to ban the diesel 
engine by or before 2040 with numerous cities across the globe making similar 
announcements. The transport sector is responsible for 23% carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions and over 25% of oil demand according to the World Resources Institute 
(WRI) [2] and the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) [3]. The European 
Union (EU) has been a leader in the fight against automotive emissions, thanks in 
part to the Dieselgate scandal and concerns about climate change. The true global 
leader in pushing vehicle electrification to the fore, however, is China.
It is widely accepted among Chinese authorities that a key to continued 
growth of the domestic economy is through investment along multiple parts of 
next-generation supply chains, effectively owning the intellectual property that 
emerges from it. Programs such as Made in China 2025 have laid bare the desire 
on the part of the Chinese state for deeper integration into and dominance of 
next-generation supply chains. Made in China 2025 is essentially a blueprint for 
next-generation industrial dominance where China aims to control at least 70% of 
the global production of industries such as new energy vehicles, high-end micro-
chips, renewable energy infrastructure, robots, and advanced medical technology 
with slightly less ambitious goals for other industries [4]. This push has met with 
predictable pushback from other competitor countries such as the United States, 
but China’s intentions and goals are laid bare for all to see.
A second tailwind for electrification in the future concerns the lithium ion 
battery itself and its cost trajectory. Bloomberg New Energy Finance claims that 
battery prices in terms of $ per kWh have fallen by 87% since 2010 [5]. While 
Moore’s law is not applicable with lithium ion batteries, these devices have undoubt-
edly benefitted from the technology-driven cost deflation which emanates from a 
mix of scaled production and technological advances in increased energy density. 
Lithium’s light weight and capacity to store energy dictate that it is the material of 
choice for energy storage and mobility for at least the next decade despite other 
competing storage technologies. Lithium ion batteries have been commercially used 
for 30 years. That mix of a safety record, coupled with light weight and capacity to 
store a charge, places it at the top of the battery metal pyramid.
It is important to realize that metrics such as costs and demand growth rates 
will not move in a linear fashion as battery technology continues to improve. 
Though COVID-19 has caused a re-think of demand numbers across the supply 
chain, the general trend of double-digit demand growth remains intact over the 
long term. One of the challenges for automotive companies concerns the rapidly 
evolving battery technology and which will be the ultimate winner. There are 
at least six major types of lithium ion battery chemistries alone, and building a 
multibillion-dollar business around one or two of these chemistries is a decision 
many in corporate board rooms wrangle with as we speak. It is generally agreed 
upon in the industry that there will not be a single-cell format or lithium ion 
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chemistry that ultimately wins, as different applications have different power 
and energy density requirements.
Regardless of the lithium ion chemistry of choice, the upstream portion of the 
lithium ion supply chain—raw materials—will need to grow rather dramatically in 
size in order to meet even base case assumptions for EV penetration in the com-
ing years. This presents both an opportunity and a challenge as there are multiple 
lithium ion battery chemistries, multiple cell formats, and multiple battery sizes 
measured kilograms per kilowatt-hours. As an example, assuming a 10% EV sales 
penetration rate, the demand for lithium will increase by 3×, cobalt will increase 
by 2.5× based on author estimates. These numbers could change slightly based on 
changes in any of the factors previously listed, but the fact remains—we are going 
to need substantial amounts of additional raw material supply to electrify the global 
transport sector.
Similar demands will be placed on downstream portions of the supply chain 
with cathode production across different chemistries expected to grow strongly, cell 
and battery manufacturing growth all but obvious, and original equipment manu-
facturers (OEMs) committing reportedly $300B in electrification efforts across the 
next decade [6]. Each piece of the supply chain here must coordinate its growth 
with the other pieces (or heads of the hydra) in order to ensure optimal capital 
allocation and prevent waste and undue excess production capacity.
3. Supply chain growth and regionalization
For the lithium ion supply chain to grow sustainably as mentioned above, there 
is an assumption that needs to be made and several challenges that need to be 
navigated.
The assumption in question is that consumer demand for EVs and demand from 
fleets such as Amazon and car rental companies will materialize on a time frame 
suitable to investors and companies alike. This narrative still appears intact despite 
a COVID-19-led demand implosion and total cost of ownership (TCO) EV costs 
that are still higher than that of internal combustion engine (ICE)-powered cars. As 
of April 2020, it is still unclear what the effects of COVID-19 will be on consumer 
sentiment toward EVs, but some anecdotal evidence suggests that once price parity 
is achieved coupled with intangible benefits of cleaner air, the demand for EVs 
should recover [7]. This assumption bears careful scrutiny as the effects of COVID-
19 continue to evolve. It would be fair to say that EV demand in the current environ-
ment will certainly be delayed, but not denied.
The benefits of companies such as FedEx or Amazon decarbonizing their fleets 
speak for itself as fleet operating efficiencies and the opportunities for companies 
to burnish their “green credentials” outweigh the near-term higher switching costs. 
Amazon has committed to having 100,000 electric delivery vans in its fleet by 2030, 
reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 4 million metric tons per year [8]. Again, 
widespread EV adoption rests on the assumption that these goals are achieved in the 
stated time frame.
The challenges to wider electrification have already been mentioned and perhaps 
deserve their own chapter in this book. While the lingering effects of COVID-19 are 
still to be determined, it is fair to conclude that smaller, more robust, regionalized 
supply chains are likely to result from current events. This effective “rebuild” of 
supply chains will take time, money, and political will. Combining all three is an 
enormous challenge, but there are examples to draw from historically such as the 
Marshall Plan which aided in rebuilding Europe in the wake of the Second World 
War. De-globalization is gaining appeal in 2020 as critical material dependence, 
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income inequality, and the fragility of the existing global supply chain system are 
laid bare for all to see.
A new example of battery supply chain regionalization concerns the European 
Battery Alliance and its strategic action plan to position batteries at the center of a 
new wave of industrialization in Europe [9]. The underlying strategy of achieving a 
degree of autonomy and owning next-generation intellectual property is of para-
mount importance and a key measure of long-term success.
Future cash flows and battery-inspired intellectual property, also highly valu-
able, are at stake. The call for more self-sufficiency in supply chain development 
will only grow louder as globalization shrinks and the opportunity to dominate a 
fast-growing sector becomes apparent to investors of all stripes. It is to investors 
that we now turn.
4. Investment risks and implications
Perhaps the most overlooked aspect of lithium ion supply chain growth is the 
most important—the funding. Many people assume that the rollout to mass electri-
fied transit will be linear and relatively seamless, but history suggests that trans-
formative change is anything but. While discussions of double-digit compound 
annual growth rates (CAGR) for raw materials are enticing, pairing adequate sums 
of capital optimally along the supply chain has proven to be a challenging exercise. 
This is due to the fact that the mining segment of this supply chain is subject to 
infrequent and enormous cyclical swings in pricing, leading to a traditional boom-
and-bust cycle. As an example of a typical commodity cycle is shown in Figure 2.
Embedded in the capital cycle thematic are risks unique to strategic metals such 
as lithium and cobalt. These can be broadly grouped into four categories: financial, 
geopolitical, social, and technology.
Financial risks center on issues like access to capital, determining the cost of 
capital, commodity pricing, the effect of technology on cost, and macroeconomic 
headwinds or tailwinds. The cost of and access to capital are causally related to 
what point we find ourselves in the capital cycle. When lithium carbonate pricing 
peaked at roughly $20,000 USD per ton in April 2018, equity share prices were at 
all-time highs, capital expansion plans were being announced on an almost daily 
basis, and capital was widely available. Fast forward to April 2020, equity share 
prices have crashed by as much as 65%, capital expansion plans have by and large 
Figure 2. 
The typical boom-and-bust cycle and return on investment. Source: Capital Returns: Investing through the 
Capital Cycle—A Money Manager’s Reports 2002–2015, by Edward Chancellor.
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been shelved by lithium miners and project developers, and the capital that is 
available has much more stringent strings attached to it than before to compensate 
for elevated risk. While some of this retrenchment is related to COVID-19, the asset 
behavior is typical of a boom-and-bust cycle.
Geopolitical risks include resource nationalism, resource dependence, and a 
single country (China, in this instance) exerting control over most of the full supply 
chain for critical minerals. When lithium pricing spiked through 2017, calls to 
protect “the people’s lithium” from foreign exploitation in countries such as Chile 
only grew louder. The battery metals are somewhat unique in this regard as the 
small market size of lithium or cobalt (e.g., 300,000 tons per year and 140,000 tons 
per year, respectively) masks their strategic importance to next-generation tech-
nologies. Governments around the world such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom have designated these natural resources as “critical” and have proposed 
legislation to help lessen dependence on foreign adversaries [10] (Figure 3).
The social risks apply to the mining industry as a whole and have taken on new 
relevance with environment, social, and governance (ESG) mandates increas-
ingly required by investors before committing any capital. What steps a company 
along the lithium ion supply chain is undertaking to minimize CO2 emissions is a 
notable example of renewed ESG focus. The recent questioning of globalization 
as an enabler of income inequality and the resulting explosion of populist senti-
ment is another example of the challenges lithium ion supply chain companies face 
amidst a backdrop of strong growth in the coming decade. How this growth will 
be financed given ESG mandates and how the wealth will be shared (if at all) are 
looming questions.
A final risk is centered on the role of technology. An example is the optimization 
and deployment of new technologies to lower costs in lithium extraction. Better 
known as direct lithium extraction (DLE) technologies, these technologies such as 
solvent extraction or ion exchange have the potential to reshape the lithium cost 
curve. While the technologies themselves are well known, the potential benefits to 
lithium include dramatically lower extraction and purification costs, mitigation of 
the need for large brine ponds, and reduction in the time it takes to produce high-
purity lithium chemicals. While this technology is not scaled as of this writing, 
Figure 3. 
China’s dominance of all aspects of the EV supply chain is evident. Source: Benchmark Mineral Intelligence.
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there are a number of these processes competing for investor capital predicated on 
these benefits [11].
4.1 The trouble with pricing
The recent price swings in lithium and cobalt have caused more damage to 
capital availability in the lithium ion supply chain than benefit. Raw material price 
volatility presents one of the greatest challenges to lithium ion supply chain develop-
ment in the next decade. Enormous sums are required to build additional production 
capacity, but excessive volatility in raw material pricing has typically kept all but 
the largest strategic investors out of the space. These strategic investors—mainly 
Asia-based banks or lithium and cobalt users—only have so much capital and so 
much capacity to process raw materials. A move to vertically integrate supply chains 
is believed to be the answer from the automakers, but this process will be somewhat 
slower than many would like as automotive supply chains as they exist today will not 
be able to “turn on a dime” and ramp production of EVs owing to the sunk costs of 
existing infrastructure. Perhaps the vertical integration strategy of Tesla or China’s 
view of owning most of the supply chain serves as a viable model going forward.
For the sake of reference, the typical greenfield lithium mine can have an upfront 
capital expenditure of $500–600 M USD (inclusive of the mine, ore type, and pro-
cessing plant) [12]. From discovery of the asset, through development, successful 
capital raising, deployment of the said capital, project build-out, and first production, 
the typical timing is 7–10 years. If consensus lithium demand is anticipated to grow 
by three times in the next decade, this would require at least $10B USD in capital in 
an industry that traditionally generates only $3B USD in revenue per year. Should 
EV demand accelerate ahead of consensus expectations, this $10B figure could be 
conservative.
A challenge here for capital providers is that in addition to effectively timing the 
market and managing anticipated demand, the pace of change is accelerated when 
confronted with disruptive technologies such as battery chemistries or lithium 
extraction technologies. While lithium demand can increase at a linear rate, techno-
logical leaps can accelerate this demand just as COVID-19 can destroy it and wreak 
havoc with pricing.
Lithium ion battery chemistries such as lithium iron phosphate (LFP) are 
expected to lose market share quickly to their more energy dense cousins nickel-
manganese-cobalt (NMC) and nickel-cobalt-aluminum (NCA). This has not come 
to pass yet however for several reasons including improvements in LFP energy 
density [13] and lower overall raw material pricing which affects switching costs.
Aside from questions surrounding battery chemistries, the crash in equity share 
prices in Q1 2020 has served to push the typical investor into a “risk off” mentality 
despite global central banks effectively trying to backstop the financial markets and prop 
up asset prices using both monetary and fiscal levers. Without a healthy risk appetite in 
the markets, how will the CO2 reduction targets in the EU be achieved in time? How will 
China achieve its goal of 20% of new car sales in 2025 as EVs? The reality is that for these 
goals to be achieved, a flood of capital needs to come into the lithium ion supply chain 
in a hurry. Otherwise, the EV market will remain smaller for longer, with fewer winners 
who were initially willing to embrace risk and invest in supply chain development.
4.2 Visibility through futures contracts
The lithium industry has come together recently to produce a solution for 
the lack of ability to hedge price risk. The London Metal Exchange convened a 
working group in 2019 to build futures contracts for lithium chemicals [14]. These 
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contracts are aimed at providing price transparency across what has traditionally 
been a small, opaque market run in an oligopolistic fashion. The contracts are 
to be cash settled and will source pricing data from the members of the working 
group. As of April 2020, the contracts had yet to be introduced owing to logistical 
issues with price collection. Pricing data is highly proprietary in nature, and the 
futures contracts need this critical component to ensure widespread adoption 
across the industry. The opacity of pricing works to the advantage of lithium 
chemical producers such as Albemarle or SQM but acts as a detriment to potential 
capital providers who need pricing transparency and stability to commit capital at 
a reasonable cost for a significant length of time.
Owing to the traditionally small size of the market and highly specialized end 
products, lithium pricing has always been opaque with pricing determined on a 
contracted basis between the producer and buyer with a small spot market which 
exists in China for “off spec” material. Contract pricing between the producer and 
seller is a major piece of off-take agreements and is really driven by four criteria: 
the term of the contract, the amount of material for purchase, the quality of the 
material, and the depth of the relationship between producer and consumer. There 
can be a wide degree of flexibility in terms of typical off-take agreements in order 
to protect both producer and consumer from price volatility or other events which 
could require force majeure. A futures contract can help serve as an anchor to any 
off-take agreements.
5. Shared risks in capital allocation: a case study
While the immediate need for large sums of capital is clear, the source of this 
capital has traditionally been centrally located with Asia-based banks or end 
users such as battery manufacturers serving as off-take partners. While Asia, and 
China in particular, will remain the main engine of demand for EVs, other parts 
of the world such as the European Union are likely to become a larger part of the 
EV sales “pie.” This would indicate that sources of capital will need to become 
more diverse and perhaps serve local markets first. Given the typically large sums 
needed for initial capital expenditures, much of the capital comes in the form 
of debt instruments along with an equity component to ensure all stakeholder 
interests are aligned. The idea of trading offtake for financing has become a 
trusted model in the industry as the end users of lithium chemicals, for instance, 
typically have the robust balance sheets necessary to help with the financing of 
mining projects. One such case study is Pilbara Minerals, a lithium producer based 
in Australia. The company has executed several off-take agreements, but a good 
case study is the lithium concentrate agreement the company completed with 
Ganfeng lithium in 2017 [15]. This is far from the only off-take agreement Pilbara 
has executed, but what makes this deal unique is that it has multiple components. 
Ganfeng agreed to purchase up to 160,000 tpy of lithium concentrate, as well as 
taking a $20 M AUD equity position in Pilbara and offered a debt funding/pre-
payment facility to alleviate the financing challenges. This partnership model, 
where risk is spread across all stakeholders and both financing and technology 
challenges are mitigated, has been used with other lithium producers and off-take 
partners with success.
5.1 Capital allocation gone wrong: a case study
Lithium is an oligopoly, with Albemarle, SQM, Livent, Ganfeng Lithium, and 
Tianqi Lithium as the major lithium compound producers. During the most recent 
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bull market in lithium (2016–2018), these companies all pushed forward with proj-
ect expansions, and M&A activity was scarce with one exception. Tianqi Lithium 
purchased a 24% equity stake in SQM in 2018 for $4.066 billion USD. This deal 
raised several eyebrows in the lithium world in the sense that two fierce competi-
tors were integrating their respective strategies with SQM giving up more in terms 
of market intelligence, pricing, and sales strategies and gaining much less. Tianqi’s 
strategy was clear—the share purchase instantly made the company a major SQM 
shareholder and three board of director seats included with the equity position 
would ensure an intimate view of SQM’s marketing strategy and expansion plans—
plans that Tianqi could exploit to their own advantage. The deal was enveloped in 
controversy from the start in Santiago and ultimately while the transaction was 
completed successfully, a number of restrictions were placed on the three board 
seats [16].
The real capital allocation lesson from this deal, however, had yet to be learned. 
When Tianqi purchased the SQM Class A shares, they did so at a price of $65 per 
share. The purchase was funded in part with a $3.5B USD loan from CITIC Bank 
in China. Since the deal was completed, SQM share price has fallen by 65%. This, 
coupled with a dramatically lower lithium chemicals price, has caused severe liquid-
ity issues for Tianqi, harming their credit rating which was subsequently down-
graded to Caa1 with a negative outlook by Moody’s in March of 2020 [17]. Adding 
a sense of urgency, around $2B of the loan is due in November 2020. Essentially, 
Tianqi made a deal at the absolute top of the capital allocation cycle and must now 
work to strengthen its balance sheet at a particularly precarious and unpleasant 
point in lithium industry history. Unfortunate allocation decisions such as this harm 
investor confidence in the lithium sector and could delay much-needed funding for 
expansion.
6. Conclusion
The lithium ion supply chain has experienced twin shocks of a trade war and 
COVID-19 demand destruction against a backdrop of strong long-term growth 
dynamics. These forces have kick-started a re-think of globalized supply chains in 
the interest of national security and self-sufficiency. Even those who are bearish on 
EV demand see the market growing throughout this decade, and so it makes sense 
to ensure that supply chains are built with sustainability and resilience in mind as 
raw material demand experiences robust growth. Recent actions by the US, EU, and 
Chinese governments are but a taste of what is to come.
The decarbonization thematic goes together with de-globalization and is 
benefitting from the twin tailwinds of global government mandates to phase out the 
ICE and tech-driven cost deflation in the cost of lithium ion batteries. These forces 
will not remain in place indefinitely but however are set to create opportunities for 
a wider swath of investors. Assuming the rosy demand projections come to fruition, 
a robust and resilient lithium ion supply chain depends upon two things: successful 
capital accumulation and capital allocation. A world awash in liquidity indicates 
that capital accumulation in really a function of expected returns on  given project 
and the best projects will attract enough capital to sustain themselves through the 
building and commissioning phases. The challenge comes with capital allocation, 
and there are many lessons learned here about how not to deploy capital rather than 
the opposite. In recent years, capital in the lithium ion supply chain has flowed from 
a small coterie of strategic investors given raw material price opacity, price volatil-
ity, and the generally small size of the markets. This will have to change if we are to 
meet most EV penetration forecasts in the future.
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The lithium supply chain faces a dilemma. If decarbonization and EV sales 
penetration goals are to be met, much more capital is needed to fund mine and 
supply chain development today for a demand profile that only exists on paper. The 
checkered history of lithium mine capital accumulation and allocation does not 
lend confidence to those looking to invest, so how deals are structured will be a key 
to unlocking new sources of capital.
The unwieldy and unprecedented hydra-like growth of the lithium ion supply 
chain will offer multiple exciting opportunities to alter supply chains and achieve 
sustainable results for all stakeholders well into the future. The lynchpin for success 
is successful capital accumulation and deployment.
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